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Abstract
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a rapidly growing technology that is enabling innovation
on how network systems are designed and managed. Like any other technology, SDN is
susceptible to numerous security threats. The separation of planes and centralized control
topology of SDN makes it vulnerable to myriad of attacks. There has been rapid implementation
of SDN in variety of networks. However, the security of SDN topology in different deployments
and security specifications for these networks falls short. There is only a handful of resources for
enterprise networks that are actively transitioning their networks to SDN and require security
specification.
This research focuses on proposing and implementing a security framework that integrates the
basic network security requirements. Furthermore, this research identifies major security
vulnerabilities through security assessment and implements the security mechanisms to mitigate
them. It also studies the effectiveness of the security framework in improving the overall security
posture of the SDN environment. Overall, this research offers viable security mechanisms for
enterprise networks looking for performance and cost-effective security solutions.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
Software-defined networking is a fast-paced technology that is being adapted in networks
all over the world. It has changed the traditional way of network management by shifting the
functions of different network components for programmability and added flexibility. RFC 7426
defines SDN as a programmable network approach that supports the separation of control and
forwarding planes via standardized interfaces (Haleplidis et al., 2015. This separation of planes
in a network makes network switches and routers a simple forwarding device without the
backlog of decision-making. The central logic implemented in the controller is then responsible
for network management and policy implementation (Prajapati et al., 2018).
The functionality of SDN has skyrocketed its deployment rates. Recent research has
shown that the SDN market is expected to grow from USD 13.7 billion in 2020 to USD 32.7
billion by 2025 (Software Defined Networking (SDN) Market 2019-2025 Forecast Report, n.d.)
The exponential growth is only likely to rise further, with SDN being widely used in upand-coming technologies like cloud computing and virtualization. Thus, the security of these
networks is a crucial topic that must be acknowledged along with its growth span. A welldefined security framework can leverage the flexibility of SDN architecture and factor in the
necessities of enterprise networks. Therefore, this thesis focuses on developing a framework that
defines security mechanisms for enterprise network architecture by considering factors like
performance, cost, and flexibility. Furthermore, this thesis aims to make it easier for enterprises
to integrate security mechanisms in SDN environments seamlessly.
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This chapter introduces motivating scenarios and research problems, and the paper
further contributes towards addressing the research problem.
Motivation
According to Gartner’s Magic Quadrant for WAN Edge infrastructure report, only 35%
of SD-WAN networks have implemented secure architecture (Magic Quadrant for WAN Edge
Infrastructure, n.d.). For a technology with a global market size of USD 13.7 billion in 2020, the
security implementation percentage is concerning. Compared to the SDN deployments in
enterprise networks and data centers, SDN's available security specifications and guidelines are
severely lacking. One of the primary motivations for this research is to bridge the gap between
the necessity and availability of a well-tested security framework for enterprise networks.
Another motivation for this research is the feature of SDN itself. SDN offers excellent
flexibility and functionality for managing networks. The primary stronghold of SDN, i.e.,
separation of control and data plane and the global view of the network, can be leveraged to
integrate several security mechanisms. However, the documentation available for reference and
guidelines is sparse. Open Networking forum, one of the most significant contributors for SDNrelated research and documentation, has made some technical specifications and standards
available. However, these documents lack in context of providing specific security
implementation and analyzing its impact. Therefore, this research aims to develop a framework
that assures authentication, authorization, and availability by leveraging SDN architecture.
Problem Description
The lack of proper guidelines and security framework for enterprises deploying SDN in their
environment is a concerning issue. While SDN has changed the attack surface of traditional
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networks, it has introduced a new realm that can be exploited (Xu, 2017). Each layer of SDN has
underlying vulnerabilities that needs to be addressed. They are briefed below.
•

Application Plane: One of the most critical vulnerabilities arises from the lack of
authentication mechanism between the application and SDN controller. There is no
uniform authentication protocol like TLS for the northbound interface. Because of
lack of standardization, northbound APIs are highly controller-dependent (Cui et al.,
2017). The lack of standardized authentication protocol and encryption mechanisms
exposes the application plane to the threat of fraudulent flow rule insertion by
malicious and compromised applications.

•

Control plane: The control plane faces the highest risk of attacks in an SDN
environment as it controls all network activities. It faces the threat of DDoS, MITM,
and spoofing attacks from both southbound and northbound interfaces because of the
lack of compelling authentication and encryption mechanisms. Although specified,
TLS is not widely used in southbound interface communication because of technical
and operational constraints. The older versions of TLS, i.e., versions older than
TLSv.1.2, have been deemed insecure by many researchers based on their
breakability (Simos et al, 2016). The lack of adequate access control mechanisms also
poses a threat of controller access by unauthorized entities. Authentication,
authorization and trust mechanism among controller and other network entities needs
to be established to assure security for the controller (Dacier et al., 2017).
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•

Data Plane: In an SDN topology, the data plane is highly dependent on the
controller. This dependency results in the data plane being reliant on the controller for
security provisioning as well. The data plane is at the risk of TCP level attacks and
MITM attacks due to the optional use of TLS (Ahmad et al., 2015). The data plane
entities are also highly likely to be targeted for fraudulent flow rules because of a lack
of access control and authorization mechanisms (Celesova et al., 2019).

A majority of similar research shows that SDN lacks security specification that addresses
basic security requirements like authentication and authorization. Despite the surge in enterprises
adopting SDN, there is a lack of security specifications and a security framework for SoftwareDefined Networks. Lack of specification also means that many enterprises overlook security
implementation because of added overhead and higher technical barriers (Benton et al., 2013).
Therefore, this research proposes a security framework that utilizes well-known security
mechanisms and leverages the features of SDN for easier management. The research focuses on:
1. Studying and identifying major security issues within SDN deployed enterprise
environment.
2. Proposing and implementing security mechanisms to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities.
3. Proposing a security framework for enhancing security in enterprise infrastructure.
Study Questions/Hypothesis
This research establishes the following questions in order to meet its objectives:
RQ1: How can security prerequisites be identified in Software-Defined Networks (SDN)?
RQ2: What vulnerabilities and attack surfaces are associated with Software Defined Networks
(SDN) topology?
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RQ3: How can the security of SDN be improved? Can SDN architecture be leveraged to enhance
the security of the SDN?
Upon answering the above-mentioned research questions, this research establishes a security
framework that caters to the fundamental security prerequisite, i.e., Authentication,
Authorization, and Availability. Further contributions include the following:
•

Analysis of SDN architecture from a security standpoint and analysis of the attack
surface

•

A comprehensive security specification for networks that are in the process of deploying
SDN

Limitations of the Study
Since security is a constant process, there are different impediments when attempting to
build a security framework. Firstly, we could not cover the northbound interface extensively
because of the lack of standardization of Northbound interfaces, forcing the process to be
controller-dependent (Banse & Rangarajan, 2015). As a result, using the Ryu controller for
simulations largely influences the northbound interface API and available options.
Secondly, the study could not run a series of experiments to test the level of threats
before and after implementing the framework because of the lack of available resources. These
factors can influence the study and thus needs to be taken into account.
Definition of Terms

12
SDN (Software Defined Network): It is an architecture that enables flexible management of
computer networks by separating the data forwarding plane and control plane and provides
logically centralized management though programmable interfaces (Yurekten & Demirci, 2021).
OpenFlow: It is a communication protocol that allows direct access and manipulation of the
forwarding plane of network devices, both physical and virtual (Wenjual et al., 2016). It is a
standard API used by SDN for communication among different planes.
Enterprise network: it is the IT infrastructure of a midsize and large organization that facilitates
connectivity and communication.
SDN controller: It is a logically centralized SDN component that provides visibility of the
network to the applications. It also translates the requirements from the application plane down
to the data paths (SDN Architecture Overview, 2013).
Southbound Interface: This is the interface between the control plane and the data plane. SDN
controller uses SBI to control the data plane elements (Alabarce & Bravalheri, 2018).
Northbound interface: This is the interface between the Control plane and Application plane.
NBI typically provides abstract network views and enables the direct expression of network
behavior and requirement (SDN Architecture Overview, 2013).
Summary
This chapter introduces the area of study and sheds light on the problem domain and
issues that require prompt solutions. It also proposes a study that will be able to tackle those
issues. Finally, the chapter raises crucial questions that will be later answered during the
research.
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature
Introduction
To better understand the requirement for this paper and further the study on SDN
security, a review of existing literature is pertinent. It is necessary to understand SDN
architecture before moving on to the security analysis of its components. This chapter covers the
explanation of SDN topology followed by a review of the literature for SDN security. It focuses
on different studies that have analyzed the architecture and features of Software-defined
Networks and projects their findings. A deeper look at the literature will give insights into the
lacking security prospect in SDN deployed networks.
Overview of SDN
Software-Defined Networking technology enables virtualization in an everyday network
by separating planes and integrating programmability in the centralized controller system. The
programmability of controllers offers an abstraction from lower-level infrastructure, making it
possible to simplify policy-based routing and management instead of using proprietary protocols
and vendor-based configuration sets (Correa Chica et al., 2020). In addition, the topology of
SDN, which is different from traditional networks, enables the segregation of network control
and packet forwarding in SDN.
A typical SDN architecture can be segregated into three planes: Application plane, Control
Plane, and Data Plane. Each plane communicates with the other through a specified interface.
Each component of SDN architecture is explained in detail below:
1. Application Plane
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This plane includes applications and services, mainly comprised of end-user applications that
consume network services (El Moussaid et al., 2017). Services residing in the application plane
include network topology discovery, network provisioning, and security systems like IDS/IPS
and monitoring services. These services work in conjunction with the control plane via the
northbound interface. This communication contains parameters like delay, throughput, and
availability descriptors, providing applications a more comprehensive view of the network
(Bakhshi, 2017).
2. Control Plane
The control plane is the core of SDN architecture. It is responsible for controlling packet
forwarding, switching decisions, and configuring the data plane using a southbound interface.
Being the powerhouse of SDN, its functionalities include but are not limited to topology
discovery and maintenance, route selection, and policy control. Programming for making
decisions on packet forwarding and network routing happens in this plane within the SDN
controller. SDN controller answers individual application requests and objectives such as traffic
prioritizing, access control, bandwidth management and relays it to the data plane components
(Bakhshi, 2017). Admins can write and rewrite rules for how network traffic, data packets, and
frames traverse the network and how the network infrastructure in this layer handles them. This
layer also enables support for business applications like SLAs, QoS, and Policy Management
(Dacier et al., 2016).
3. Data Plane
The Data plane includes network devices and physical resources such as switches, routers, and
hubs which forward packets based on central policies (El Moussaid et al., 2017). It is also termed

15
the infrastructure layer because of the physical and virtual devices it includes. Communication
between data and the control plane happens through the southbound interface. Responsibilities
of data plane include packet forwarding, dropping, managing operation state of network devices,
etc.
4. Southbound Interface
The southbound interface is the communication interface between the control plane and data
plane, which allows the controller to interact with the data plane elements. The control plane
communicates network policies, flow tables, and network updates to and from the data plane
entities via the southbound interface (Shin et al., 2012). SBI supports and uses different protocols
for this communication. However, OpenFlow protocol is the standard communication protocol
for the southbound interface. Communication in this interface happens over TCP.
5. Northbound Interface
The northbound interface is the interface used by applications and controllers to interact with
each other. This interface enables the programmability of the controllers by exposing the
network abstraction data model and other functionalities within the controllers (Jarraya et al.,
2014). Unlike the southbound interface, there is no standardized protocol for northbound
communication yet. Thus, the communication highly relies on vendor-proprietary methods.
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Software-defined networking topology and approaches have plenty of advantages over
conventional network architecture. The inherent features of SDN enable convenience and
versatility. Some of the features of SDN are briefed below:
1. Centralized Control
One of the differentiating features of SDN is its centralized control. Network intelligence is
separated from the network devices and aggregated within a logically centralized control plane.
Centralized control manages the entirety of networks by communicating network policies, flow
tables regarding data flow information, managing application permission, allocating resources,
etc (Gard & Garg, 2014). Because the centralized controller powers all critical network
operations, it simplifies the network management process by a great deal.
2. Virtualization and Programmability
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SDN enables programmability and virtualization by decoupling the data and control logic.
The centralized control of SDN allows the development and implementation of programs and
policies locally. Administrators can automate the network management process by leveraging the
abstract control of SDN. The programmability inherently supports network virtualization as SDN
provides network abstraction (Gard & Garg, 2014). SDN also provides the abstract view of the
network, which simplifies network operation and management.
3. Flexibility and Rapid innovation
SDNs are much more flexible and thus allow the coordination of different network device
behavior through programming. This flexibility makes SDN more open standards based and
simplifies network management and expansion. Since the devices can be configured and
controlled using a set of policies independent of vendor proprietary language, SDNs are also
much easier to upgrade. Unlike the traditional network where network devices had services
embedded in them, all network management and control in SDN happens within the control
plane.
Background Related to the Problem
The background of the problem discusses the various challenges that SDN faces.
Assessing these problems helps understand the different impacts it has and helps explore the
ways to mitigate them. The most common and pressing challenges are:
1. Denial of service (DoS)
Denial of service attack is coordinated attack that target to exhaust the resources of any
system and deem it unavailable by using flooding techniques. DoS attacks, coordinated on a
more extensive and distributed scale, are called distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. It is
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achieved by launching attacks from hundreds of compromised systems called botnets on the
network. Over time these attacks have evolved and have posed significant threats to systems and
networks. In modern networks such as SDN, attackers use multiple vectors to find loopholes and
launch an attack. Some major types of attacks are volumetric, state exclusion, and applicationlayer attacks, and they include DNS flood attacks, HTTP flood attacks, Low and Slow attacks,
and HTTPS flood attacks (Girma et al., 2015).
In an SDN network, the control plane is the central controller and the network manager and
thus faces the most threat. Attack on the control plane renders the entire network unavailable. In
addition, a lack of a proper security mechanism and policies allows exploits to go unnoticed. In a
controller and switch communication, if the data packet does not match the flow table, the
OpenFlow switch sends the packet in a message to the OpenFlow controller and continuously
uploads the messages (Wei et al., 2016). An attacker can exploit this feature to congest the
network and make the controller unresponsive by sending an array of messages triggered by a
spoofed packet (Sun et al., 2019). The same technique can cause overload issues on the
southbound channel responsible for communication between the data plane and the control
plane. An attacker can also leverage the lack of trust mechanism between switch and controllers
to launch DDoS attacks by aggregating enough power force from switches under its control. The
attacker can incite attacks even in the presence of a secure communication channel like SSL/TLS
(Kreutz et al., 2016). Furthermore, an attacker can use methods like compromising the data
plane, connecting a new rogue machine on the network, injecting malicious code, and using
malware to successfully carry out DDoS attacks in lack of a robust security mechanism.
2. Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
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Man-in-the-middle attacks are the ones that an attacker uses to intercept communication
between two parties to collect information or modify its contents with a malicious motive. For
example, malicious actors can use these attacks to collect traffic for analysis to find confidential
information. Alternatively, an attacker can place themselves in the middle and modify the
original content. In either case, this results in significant security issues relating to
confidentiality, integrity, and privacy.
In the context of an SDN network, communication between the controller, network devices,
and applications is vital in the proper functioning of the network. Any risks of exposure or
modification of inter-plane communication can cause significant issues making MITM attacks a
considerable threat. MITM attack allows the attackers to capture, duplicate and spoof flows by
targeting the interfaces and the SDN nodes. As previously mentioned, typical SDN networks use
OpenFlow for communication between planes. OpenFlow uses TLS for secure communication
over TCP. However, this requirement is an optional feature in the specification. Since the
implementation of TLS creates a higher technical barrier for network operators, many choose to
skip its implementation. In addition to this, many OpenFlow switch, and controller vendors have
not fully implemented TLS specifications (Benton et al., 2013). This lack of support and effort
has a severe effect on the security of the SDN network. Over time, several vulnerabilities have
also been discovered in older versions of TLS, making it susceptible to man-in-the-middle
attacks and session hijacking. This has created a need to find a robust security measure for secure
communication assurance in SDN.
3. Identity Spoofing
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Identity spoofing is the act of assuming another person’s or a system’s identity and using that
privilege to accomplish a goal. It is a common method used by malicious attackers to launch
different attacks on a network or a system. There are various techniques like social engineering,
reconnaissance, use of malware, etc., to instigate identity spoofing attacks.
In SDN, the proper functioning of networks needs communication between different
components. Devices on the data plane rely on central control for flow table, updates on changes,
and other network updates. The input of network devices to the control plane also triggers
changes in the network. A malicious actor can use this feature to launch various attacks by
utilizing identity spoofing. Since the SDN specification lacks a well-defined trust mechanism, an
attacker can compromise a host in the data plane and manipulate the flow. Besides, the
compromised host can be used to fake entities (like an application or a controller) and control the
entire network. The escalated privilege on the compromised hosts gives the attacker full access
to configuration and management data, log information, and other sensitive information (Threat
Analysis for the SDN Architecture, 2016).
Identity spoofing can also be used to render a network device unusable. An attacker can
use a spoofed identity to send malicious content to the controller. In the presence of a filtering
policy, the controller can blacklist the victim device. This series of events will affect the proper
functioning of the network. Identity spoofing can be used in many different ways by an attacker
to access the system and manipulate it to their desire. Therefore, software-defined networks
require a robust trust and identity management system. It is equally essential to implement a
secure communication protocol, as previously discussed.
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Literature Related to the Problem
Software-defined network has been a boon in terms of network management and
programmability. Its feature is attractive to new and upcoming technologies. However, the
newness of SDN also implies the lack of proper security specifications for deployment in
different kinds of networks. Studies done on SDN with a security perspective can provide
insights into where SDN lacks and needs the most work. This section offers a review of relevant
articles that cover those security issues.
In software-defined networks, the control plane is responsible for policy creation and
implementation. The control plane also oversees decision making process based on the global
view of the network. The flow rule determines the flow of data packets. An attacker can bypass
security devices that lack notable security measures implementation. Also, because of SDN’s
architecture, it is relatively easy for the attacker to obtain a global view of the network and learn
about the current security posture of the network (Liu et al., 2019).
Another study done in vulnerabilities related to flow rule observed that attackers could
bypass rules or policies by running malicious applications that can construct overlapping and
conflicting flow rules. This attack leverages the fact that controllers cannot distinguish between
pre-bound and newly issued rules (Correa Chica et al., 2020). It presents threats of network
misconfiguration, malfunction, denial of service, and other threats if leveraged in a certain way
by an attacker.
Similarly, a study done in the SDN network showed how an attacker could exploit the
intrinsic property of SDN architecture. If the data plane comes across packets with no handling
information during data flow, the data plane reaches out to the control plane for flow
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information. A spoofed device can continuously send out such packets to the control plane to
exhaust the communication channel and the controller itself. It also gives an insight to an
attacker if the network uses OpenFlow switches, which can be used to generate specially crafted
flow requests towards the controller (Shin & Gu, 2013). An attacker can use this kind of attack to
wear out the controller prompting a Denial-of-Service attack.
Another study found a threat of link fabrication attack in SDN connection protocol. SDN
uses Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) for internal link discovery service. However, it
cannot verify the legitimacy of LLDP packets or the patch of the packets during the transmission.
Attackers can exploit this overlook on security to execute link fabrication attacks. Link
fabrication attacks are used by adversaries to inject fake links in the network through which they
can control the traffic which traverses the malicious link (Khan et al., 2020). These attacks can
take any form, from forgery to relay (Huang et al., 2020).
OpenFlow is one of the most common technologies used by SDN networks. There are
many studies on the workings and security of the protocol and design of OpenFlow. While
OpenFlow switch specification describes using TLS as a communication protocol, the feature is
optional. Furthermore, there is no specification on any other authentication mechanism for
communication between the control and the data plane (Scott-Hayward et al., 2016). This lack of
authentication mechanism is a significant overlook on security. Studies have shown that
attackers can exploit this vulnerability for different man-in-the-middle attacks and DoS attacks.
It paves an easy path for attackers to manipulate and control the central management system by
hijacking a communication channel.
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In traditional SDN networks, middleboxes were integrated as a security component to
block malicious users. Middleboxes add a layer of security by including security systems such as
IDS. Despite their usefulness, some studies have shown that attackers can weaponize
middleboxes against the system. Incorporating these extra modules for security can also create an
overhead for a central controller resulting in an overlook of legitimate intrusion attacks (Rawat &
Reddy, 2017).
There are several similar studies done on SDN networks and their architecture. Most
studies have noted that SDN networks’ prime security issues are a bottleneck between data plane
and control plane, lack of secure communication channel, and issues related to central control.
These issues lead to potential risks of DoS attacks, spoofing attacks, and Man-in-the-middle
attacks. The segregation of control and data plane in SDN networks make up for different attack
surfaces. The data layer, application layer, controller, OpenFlow switches, communication
protocol, and traffic flow are the attack surface that an attacker can exploit in many ways (Rawat
& Reddy, 2017). The analysis of SDN networks suggests that the very features that an attacker
can exploit can be used to secure the network.
Literature Related to the Methodology
In an effort to secure the SDN environment, researchers have studied and proposed
several mechanisms. These mechanisms include authentication and authorization techniques,
encryption methods and access control models. There are also different proposals of security
frameworks for SDN topology. This section will identify some of the related efforts made to
secure the SDN environment.
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A recent study (Li et al., 2020) proposes a secure framework for SDN-based Edge
computing in IoT-enabled healthcare systems. The framework includes a lightweight
authentication scheme to authenticate the IoT devices in the network. The authentication scheme
authenticates IoT devices by identifying them based on the operating frequency bands, i.e.,
access frequencies or time slots. Upon authentication, the devices collect data from the end-user
and send them to an Edge server with a central controller for storage, processing, and analysis.
The proposed framework helps improve security in devices with less computational capacity by
introducing a secure authentication mechanism.
Another study (Fawcett et al., 2018) proposes a distributed SDN framework-Tennison for
scalable network security. The framework presents a distributed implementation that includes
multiple control instances, tunneling for efficient attack detection and mitigation, and multi-level
monitoring. The multiple levels of monitoring include lightweight monitoring that can handle
high volume of data flow. This framework aims in providing scalable and transparent security.
The framework aids security by optimizing network monitoring and protection through
appropriate switch/controller assignment and monitoring rule placement. This study has future
potential for scaling by automating the processes.
Cisco’s Zero Trust, Zero Touch (Dukinfield & Richardson, 2019) is another recent
innovation that integrates a layered security approach for network security. This approach
incorporates visibility into the control, data, orchestration, and management planes in Softwaredefined networks with a goal of faster threat detection/remediation. This SDN approach set
forward by Cisco bases on defense-in-depth techniques. It includes multiple layers of protection
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automated by leveraging SDN’s programmability. This framework provides a holistic approach
to securing the entire network by taking advantage of programmability and visibility.
Another study (Ammar et al., 2016) proposes a framework for SDN deployment in data
centers. The framework provides an adaptive self-defending network that can detect threats by
analyzing network traffic and searching for anomalous patterns. It integrates series of security
monitoring such as Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion Prevention System backed by a
Syslog service. The framework’s control unit contains the security agent unit and Syslog server,
and it integrates with the SDN controller. One of the significant advantages of this framework is
that it supports out-of-band management for network traffic so that it does not affect network
latency for services. Furthermore, the independent design of security agent from the SDN
controller adds on to the scalability of this framework.
Another study on controller security proposes (Isong et al., 2017) a trust establishment
framework between SDN controller and applications. The trust framework uses a direct trust
establishment mechanism based on observing activities performed by SDN applications when
requesting network resources. Trust establishment is complete between the controller and
applications upon the completion of direct trust calculation. This framework provides security to
the controller from malicious and rogue devices and secures SDN from many threats.
Karmakar et al. (2020), propose a security architecture for SDN infrastructure that uses a
policy-based approach to coordinate different security mechanisms. The dynamic policy
framework presented in this architecture enables the detection and mitigation of security attacks.
It leverages feedback between various security components and mechanisms. The policies put
constraints over users, flows, services, IP, MAC, and port which allows for controlling and
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managing the flow communication. The proposed framework also integrates a trust management
framework to evaluate the trustworthiness of the OpenFlow switch at run-time. In addition, it
includes a signature-based intrusion detection system to detect intrusions. A key management
mechanism is in place to maintain secure communication between the central controller and the
OpenFlow switches.
Hussein et al. (2016), propose an SDN security plane for resilient security services in
software-defined networks. The proposal presents an additional plane dedicated to security. The
security plane is responsible for forwarding data packets between the data plane and the control
plane. A security module is present before the controller, responsible for collecting and
analyzing all data traffic coming from all agents. This module helps detect abnormal events and
trigger alarms to the controller. The framework includes DDoS prevention by including a
threshold to compare the collected traffic.
Shi et al. (2017), propose a security architecture that aims to provide defense ability to
the infrastructure corresponding to each plane. The proposal includes an access control strategy
based on attribute-based encryption. The encryption uses a tree structure to achieve fine-grained
SDN access control. The proposed mechanism comprises four components: a trusted server to
manage identity, the attributed center, the access subject, and the access object.
Pandya et al. (2018), propose a framework for securing SDN southbound communication
to improve the security posture. The southbound APIs are the connecting channel between the
control plane and the data plane. The security of the southbound interface ensures the integrity
and confidentiality of the communication between the control and forwarding elements. The
paper suggests a framework that leverages security systems similar to middleboxes and a key
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distribution center to digitally signed messages for addressing data integrity and authorization.
The middle-box solution ensures that only authorized devices have access to the network is
accessed, and the Key Distribution Center (KDC) provides authentication.
Sallam et al. (2019), propose Software Defined Perimeter (SDP) to manage the
connections in software-defined networks and inherently build a secure environment. Some of
the primary concerns in SDN are authentication, authorization, access control, privacy, and
integrity. Integrating security systems within SDN helps with tackling security issues. A typical
SDP consists of three main components: Initiating host, accepting host, and the controller. These
components create secure perimeters among legitimate clients and network services. The
proposed framework is tested in a virtual testbed for effectiveness in integrating and enhancing
security.
An overview of the above-mentioned security frameworks and architecture shows
different attempts to enhance software-defined networks’ security. These works include joint
effort in securing individual components and overall network perimeter. This research supports
the venture of improving SDN security by proposing a secure framework that leverages standard
security mechanisms to enhance security in software-defined networks. This security assurance
is achieved by focusing on authentication, authorization, and encryption.
Summary
Software-defined Network differs from the traditional network in structure and
management. The perversion means that many typical security practices do not adequately
secure SD-Networks. Therefore, there have been numerous research done for improving the
security of SDN and its components. This chapter provided an overview of SDN and its
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components along with the security vulnerabilities present in them. It included vulnerabilities
inherent in the network and the different threats associated with each vulnerability. In addition,
this chapter did a review of existing literature that studied SDN in a similar capacity as this
research.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
This chapter presents the designs, tools, and mechanisms used to develop and implement
this research. Firstly, the design of the study section briefly discusses the security requirements
required prior to designing a security framework. Then, the proposed framework is explained in
depth. This is followed by data collection for the research. Lastly, this section presents an
overview of tools and mechanisms used throughout this research.
Design of the Study
To propose a security framework, it is first necessary to identify the security requirements
of Software-defined networks. Upon studying SDN architecture and its workflow, we were able
to identify the security requirements in SDN environments. These requirements include but are
not limited to basic security requirements, i.e., Authentication, Authorization, Accountability,
and Traceability. We will discuss further some security requirements specific to SDN in this
segment.
Authentication
Authentication is a fundamental requirement in Software-defined Networks. A large
amount of sensitive control information flows between the control plane and the data plane. This
communication between the controller and switches requires a robust authentication mechanism.
Although the OpenFlow protocol supports TLS, its adoption is widely lacking. The current
OpenFlow specification (v1.5.1) does not mandate the use of TLS, which has resulted in many
vendors’ devices not supporting TLS adoption. An overhead of traffic and complexity in
configuring is also responsible for minimal TLS adoption in Software-defined networks
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(Abdullaziz et al., 2016). TLS v1.2 and above include advanced cipher suites for end-to-end
encryption. The use of secure protocols helps deal with tampering of communication between
SDN components and helps perform mutual authentication (rfc5925, n.d.).
Authorization
Authorization is another requirement for SDN to ensure that different components have
set permission to access and modify the network resources. Authorization helps to limit the
controller’s exposure to the rest of the network. This factor decreases the controller’s
vulnerability. A trust mechanism helps in determining the authorization level for each
component in the network upon establishment. By default, there is no authorization module or
specification for the SDN environment. However, the programmability of SDN allows to set up
access control mechanisms and permissions for authorized access among components. One
convenient way to set up authorization among components is setting up rule-based access control
in SDN. Access control procedures can include a permission-based and role-based authorization
system to facilitate the administration of app authorization (Al-Alaj et al., 2019). The same
technique can be leveraged to authorize devices to ensure that only authorized devices can
communicate with the controller.
Accountability and Traceability
All transactions in network and security controls should be auditable to ensure system
security. Security mechanisms that include monitoring and alerting can contribute to assuring
network availability. A proper logging system integrated into a SIEM, or similar centralized
repository helps maintain a monitoring and alert system. SDN’s programmability and visibility
extensively support log implementation and management. Logging, monitoring, and IDS systems
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can be integrated into the network to monitor network activity and alert about possible
anomalous behavior. Standard systems like Snort or BRO IDS can provide a cheaper and
convenient option. Snort has been seen to have less strain on network QoS such as performance,
delay, and throughput (Hendrawan et al., 2019). The flexibility of SDN facilitates the
implementation of a wide range of monitoring and alerting solutions.
Security by default
In addition to authentication and authorization, and real-time monitoring, the network
must be secure by default. Network administrators must follow and implement practices to
safeguard network devices, endpoints, manage applications and software in the endpoints that
interact directly with the network (Harrison & White, 2010). These practices can include
operating systems maintenance, disabling unused ports and services, and backing up crucial data.
Following best standard practices for security can help improve security. These practices can be
anything from following procedures suitable for the underlying protocols, disabling certain
services, or enabling encryption. Open Networking Foundation provides a well-documented
checklist (Threat Analysis for the SDN Architecture, 2016) that includes security requirements
for SDN controllers. This document contains security implementation specific to controllers and
general security requirements. The general requirements include but are not limited to software
integrity requirements, hardware consistency, Access control on GUI, and Virtual Machine (VM)
security. This document can provide a reference for implementing additional controls and
assuring security for the SDN topology.
Proposed SDN security framework
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In order to fulfill the security requirement, this research proposes a security framework
for Software-Defined Network. The framework includes a security unit that integrates different
security mechanisms including authentication, authorization, and monitoring mechanisms. The
framework is integrated into the SDN topology through the northbound interface. Figure 2
depicts the framework’s logical diagram. The framework provides flexibility to be tailored as per
individual requirements, i.e., it supports integrating additional security mechanisms via the
northbound interface.
Although not mandated, OpenFlow supports TLS protocol for communication between
the switch and the controller. Openflow can be configured to use TLS v1.2 or above, and the
switch and controller can be configured to mutually authenticate by exchanging certificates
signed by a site-specific private key. Openflow also supports DTLS for UDP connection (Doe,
2010). Studies have questioned the strength of TLS by examining the authenticity of certificates
and the risks of MITM attacks during the key exchange process. However, these concerns can be
managed by using Public Key Infrastructures, which help establish certificate validity chains (De
la Hoz et al., 2014). PKI systems are widely acknowledged to assure strong authentication,
integrity, and non-repudiation requirements (Jain et al., 2014). The framework uses ovs-pki
script to create an initial PKI (ryu Documentation Release 4.34, 2020). Then, a private key and
certificate are generated for both switch and controller. Next, the openvswitch daemon is
configured to use CA files. Finally, the Ryu controller is run with the CA files. This process sets
up a TLS connection for Controller-Switch communication.
While policy-based access control mechanisms are widely used, the ONF openflow
specification (OpenFlow Switch Specification, 2015) for SDN does not mandate or suggest the
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use of any specific authorization mechanisms. Therefore, for authorization purposes, the
framework integrates rule-based access control mechanism by using a stateful firewall. Firewalls
are commonly used in systems and networks for security purposes. They allow flexibility to
define rules as needed for a particular scenario (Krongbaramee & Somchit, 2018). Stateful
firewalls keep track of active connections and do not just inspect traffic on a packet-to-packet
basis. If a packet is a part of an active connection present in the firewall’s session table, it is
forwarded. The OpenFlow protocol uses TCP for communication between the switch and the
controller (Software Defined Networks – 2nd Edition, n.d.). Moreover, since stateful firewalls
filter TCP packets based on the matching rule and state of the three-way handshake, it is ideal for
access control purposes.
A stateful firewall application written in Python is taken and integrated with the Ryu
controller for this framework. Upon receipt of a packet, the switch will forward only the first few
packets of the new flow to the controller. Then, according to the policies, the firewall application
will prepare flow table entries and push the flow table to openvswitch. This process ensures that
not all packets need to be individually handled by the controller and offloads excessive controller
use (Shah, 2015). The stateful firewall script is included in Appendix A.
For monitoring and IDS/IPS roles, the framework integrates Snort. Snort (Snort –
Network Intrusion Detection & Prevention System, n.d.) is an open-source intrusion detection
and prevention system that works as a packet sniffer, packet logger, and intrusion prevention
system. Snort allows the creation and implementation of a ruleset according to requirements.
Snort can also be deployed inline production to block/flag traffic and generate an alert. Because
of its many functionalities and availability, it is a good choice for enterprise networks. In the
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proposed framework, Snort integrates with the controller via the northbound interface for
granular detection and blocking. The Ryu controller plays a vital role in managing snort rules
and openvswitch entries (Ujjan et al., 2019).
Another vital part of the network and system security is logging. Syslog (One identity llc,
2021) allows real-time log collection and processing. Its functions also include log parsing,
classification, and correlation. It also gives the added flexibility to be integrated with various
network applications to efficiently monitor and inventory logs (Rajiullah et al., 2014). Syslog
server can be used in tandem with Snort to send logs and alerts for auditing and accounting
purposes. Logs are also highly essential in identifying anomalies, setting a benchmark, and for
investigative purposes.
The proposed framework’s logical structure is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Proposed Security Framework
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Data Collection
The data collection process incorporates data from before and after the implementation of
the security framework. Initial tests are carried out in the SDN topology with the default
OpenFlow configuration. The second phase of tests is carried out upon successful framework
implementation.
Before conducting experiments for data collection, a testbed needs to be set up. This
research uses a testbed setup on a local VirtualBox. Ubuntu Machine is installed on top of
VirtualBox. For SDN simulation, Mininet is installed within the Ubuntu machine. Mininet is a
simulation software that provides an out-of-box SDN topology that can be customized using easy
python scripts. Mininet (Xu & Hu, 2017) can be used to create a custom topology, including
controller and OpenFlow switches, to perform necessary tests. Within Mininet, a simple
topology is created. The topology consists of a central controller, an OpenFlow switch, and two
connected hosts. Mininet is configured to use the Ryu controller, which is installed alongside
Mininet. Within Mininet, packet analysis & network reconnaissance tools like Wireshark and
Nmap are installed. Wireshark is a network sniffing tool that can scan any network connections
raging from Ethernet, Wi-fi, and Bluetooth (Goyal & Goyal, 2017). Nmap is an open-source
utility that is widely used for network discovery and fingerprinting remote systems, among other
capabilities. These tools will be utilized during different experiments. The security unit of the
framework, including PKI, Snort, Syslog Server, and Stateful Firewall (Shah, 2018), is set up on
Ubuntu Machine and integrated into the Ryu Controller. The testbed is shown in figure 3.
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Figure 3
Testbed Setup

Ryu controller
S1
Mininet

H1

H2

Ubuntu
Ubuntu Desktop

Assessment tools
(wireshark, Snort,etc)

Host Machine

Experiments before and after the framework implementation
In the first phase, Nmap is used for network discovery and scanning nodes for open ports
and services. Several probes for host discovery, discovering services and open ports on nodes,
system description, and uptime are done using Nmap. Similarly, Wireshark captures packets in
the southbound interface between the OpenFlow switch and the controller and the connected
hosts. In this test topology, the SDN controller is local, and thus the controller and OpenFlow
switch talk over the local interface. Therefore, we capture the packet of the loopback 0
interfaces. Communication between OpenFlow switch and hosts is captured through eth1 and
eth2 interfaces. For generating traffic, the pingall command is executed in the Mininet setup.
When this command is executed, H1 sends an ICMP packet to S1, which queries Controller C0
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for a route to H2. The controller sends flow information to S1, which S1 uses to forward the
packet to S2. Once this flow information is obtained, the packets flow between H1-S1-H2
directly until the flow information expires from the buffer. This process triggers a series of
communication in the topology.
For the second phase tests, packet captures and ICMP probe tests were done to verify the
effectiveness of security mechanisms.
Tools and Techniques
In order to assess the SDN topology and security framework, several tools and software
are utilized throughout the research. Below is the listing of the tools and software:
1. VirtualBox - A virtualization software for x86 hardware targeted at server, desktop, and
embedded use. It is used for setting up the SDN infrastructure.
2. Ubuntu Desktop 18.04 LTS - A Linux based operating system. The entire network
topology is emulated within Ubuntu desktop.
3. Mininet – A network emulator which supports creation and implementation of virtual
network. Mininet provides the SDN topology used in this research.
4. Ryu controller – An SDN controller that supports various functionalities and provides
numerous software components with well-defined API for network management. It is
used as a controller for the SDN environment in this research.
5. Wireshark - An open-source packet analyzer that helps capture and analyze network
traffic. It is used for capturing and analyzing traffic within the SDN topology. It helps in
analyzing communication protocol and its security.
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6. Snort - An open-source network intrusion detection and prevention system for Linux and
windows machines. It can be run in multiple modes for threat detection, prevention, and
logging. Snort is used as intrusion detection and logging in this research.
7. Syslog-Ng Server - A server that extends the original syslogd model for logging,
monitoring, and archiving. It is used for logging purposes in the research.
8. Stateful Firewall - A Python based firewall application for filtering traffic. It is used for
implementing device authorization within the network.
Summary
This chapter covered the proposed framework and the methodology for identifying
vulnerabilities and implementation of the proposed framework. The framework design and setup
process were explained. The reasoning behind use of different tools and mechanism was also
presented. Finally, this chapter covered how the framework is designed to function and what
tools are used throughout the framework design, implementation, and testing.
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis
Introduction
This chapter presents the results from the experiments conducted during this research.
Firstly, this section will summarize experimental results from the security assessments run on the
SDN testbed. Then, security controls that mitigate the identified vulnerabilities are implemented
and tested for efficiency. Finally, the result is analyzed to determine which security requirements
were met upon framework implementation. A comparative analysis of the framework alongside
previously existing frameworks is done.
Data Presentation
A security assessment is conducted on SDN topology to identify the vulnerabilities present in
the network components. The findings from the assessment are summarized below, along with
the details of the vulnerabilities, the root cause, prevention technique, and security
implementation.
1. No authentication between controller and switch
Details: The communication is initiated via TCP handshake in port 6633, which is the
controller's default port for openflow communication (Feature Overview and
Configuration guide Technical Guide, n.d.). There are no measures taken to authenticate
the switch or verify the device's authenticity in the network. The lack of a robust
authentication mechanism leaves the network vulnerable to attackers introducing a rogue
device.
Category: Controller Vulnerability
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Root Cause: Authentication mechanism is not set
Prevention Technique: Certificate and shared keys are common method for identity
verification. TLSv.1.2 implementation with PKI is suggested.
Security Requirement: Authentication on SDN controller interface
2. User Authentication Not Set
Details: There is no authentication mechanism deployed to authenticate a user by a
controller. This presents a threat of controller being accessed by a malicious user.
Category: Controller Vulnerability
Root Cause: No user authentication mechanism
Prevention Technique: Use of one or more authentication technique using a unique
identity.
Security Requirement: User Authentication
3. Data in Transit is unencrypted
Details: Data between controller and switch is unencrypted. Flow-Mod messages are the
ones that the controller initiates to modify the state of an OpenFlow switch. These
messages contain instructions from the controller to the switch regarding what actions to
take for matching packets. Since the flow information is communicated through flowmod packets, they are highly vulnerable and targeted by attackers. These messages can be
intercepted and modified to manipulate the messages from the controller. It can be
leveraged to disconnect network flow, manipulate traffic within the network and disrupt
essential network functions.
Category: Controller Vulnerability
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Root Cause: Encryption mechanism not set
Prevention Technique: Openflow supports security protocol TLS for securing
communication in transit (Samociuk, 2015). The newer version of TLS i.e., v1.2 or
higher can be used to secure communication between controller and the entities.
Security Requirement: Data-in-transit encryption
4. Unnecessary ports are open
Details: Ports not actively used by controller, or any services are open.
Category: Controller Vulnerabilities
Root Cause: Network/systems are not hardened according to best common practices
Prevention Technique: Assess network components for identifying unnecessary ports
and services identification. Block open ports that are not actively used.
Security Requirement: Close unnecessary ports/services
5. Log function is not defined
Details: Log function to record network operations including switch and controller
activities is not defined.
Category: Network/Controller vulnerability
Root Cause: Lack of Log function
Prevention Technique: Implement logging solutions such as Syslog server. Also,
parameters which helps in incident investigation such as username, timestamp, performed
action etc. should be captured in the logs.
Security Requirement: Log function
6. No IP check function in the controller
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Details: SDN controller doesn’t have IP whitelisting to limit the IP addresses that can
communicate with it. This allows communication via all interfaces including remote
login.
Category: Controller vulnerability
Root Cause: IP whitelisting not configured
Prevention Technique: Identify the list of trusted IP address and configure IP
whitelisting
Security Requirement: IP check
7. No privilege control of application
Details: The SDN controller has not set privilege for the applications. Privilege must be
reviewed and allocated based on least-privilege principle.
Category: Controller Vulnerabilities
Root Cause: Application privilege not defined
Prevention Technique: Review and allocate application privilege based on the least
privilege principle.
Security Requirement: Application privilege control.
8. No DDoS prevention mechanisms
Details: The controller does not have any monitoring implemented for DoS attacks
identification and prevention. There is no logging and monitoring function for network
activities. Anomalous behavior in network traffic is not monitored.
Category: Controller vulnerabilities
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Root Cause: Lack of monitoring and pre-set threshold for network activities
Prevention Technique: Monitoring and threshold configuration
Security Requirement: Anti-DoS mechanisms
9. ARP is broadcast network wide
Details: ARP is an Address Resolution Protocol used to map IPV4 address to MAC
address over Ethernet (Ammu et al., 2017). Like typical networks, SDN uses this to
resolve the mac address of the destination device. The process includes ARP broadcast
being sent to all connected hosts. The host with the specified IP responds to the ARP
broadcast, which results in MAC address resolution for the particular IP. Since ARP
(testbed version) is a stateless protocol and does not support any authentication
mechanism, an attacker can send an ARP message with false IP-to-MAC binding and
poison the ARP cache
Category: Controller Vulnerability
Root Cause: Authentication/Authorization of device is not present
Prevention Technique: Authorization of devices can be configured to ensure that only
authorized devices respond to ARP broadcast. IP whitelisting in controller also helps
eliminate risks of rogue device attempting ARP spoofing.
Security Requirement: Authenticate devices
10. OFDP protocol is used for topology discovery
Details: The OFDP protocol which is used for network discovery in SDN is
fundamentally insecure (Alharbi et al., 2016). The basic issue with this is that there is no
authentication of LLDP messages. Any switch on the network can respond to the LLDP
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packet initiated by the controller and that way a rogue switch can easily blend in the
network.
Category: Controller Vulnerabilities
Root Cause: No authentication of LLDP messages
Prevention Technique: Device authentication
Security Requirement: Authenticate devices
Security Mechanism
So far, the vulnerabilities of SDN topology have been identified along with its root causes
and necessary security implementation that will help mitigate them. This thesis proposed a
security framework to mitigate these vulnerabilities and assure security in Software-defined
networks. In the following section, the implementation of the proposed framework will be
detailed. Furthermore, the network will be re-assessed for vulnerabilities. Then an overall
analysis of the effectiveness of the proposed framework will be done.
1. TLS/SSL implementation with PKI
Step-1: Create a PKI by using ovs-pki script
To create PKI, following command is executed:
$ovs-pki init
In this case, the PKI was created upon installation.
Step-2: Create a controller private key and certificate
Next, private key and certificate is generated for the controller. ctl-privkey.pem and ctl-cert.pem
are generated in the current directory.
Step-3: Create a switch private key and certificate
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Same step is taken to create private key and certificate for the switch. Sc-privkey.pem and sccert.pem are generated in the current directory.
Figure 4
TLS/PKI Configuration in Ryu

Step-4: Configure ovs-vswitchd to use CA files using the ovs-vsctl “set-ssl” command
Then, the ovs-vswitchd is configured to use CA files using the ovs-vsctl “set-ssl” command
$ovs-vsctl set-ssl /etc/openvswitch/sc-privkey.pem \ /etc/openvswitch/sc-cert.pem \
/usr/local/var/lib/openvswitch/pki/controllerca/cacert.pem
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br0
$ ovs-vsctl set-controller br0 ssl:127.0.0.1:6633
Step-5: Run Ryu with CA files
Finally, Ryu controller is run with the CA files. Following command is executed
% ryu-manager --ctl-privkey ctl-privkey.pem \ --ctl-cert ctl-cert.pem \ --ca-certs
/usr/local/var/lib/openvswitch/pki/switchca/cacert.pem \ --verbose
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Step-6: Test
Next, we will verify the TLS connection by capturing the packet in the southbound connection.
The capture shows that the connection now uses TLS.
Figure 5
Wireshark Packet Capture From Switch To Controller

Upon successful implementation of TLSv.1.2 with PKI, following security requirements were
met:
-

Authentication on SDN controller interface

-

Data-in-transit encryption

-

Device Authentication

2. Stateful Firewall Setup/Configuration
Step 1: Define firewall rules
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First, navigate to Ryu folder within Ubuntu. Then create a text file Firewall.txt. Define necessary
rules. By default, the firewall drops all packets. Thus, rules to accept certain packets need to be
created. For this test, we create rules such that ICMP packets from H1 gets to H2 however not
the other way around. Thus, we allow 10.0.0.1(H1) to send ICMP packet to 10.0.0.2(H2).
Figure 6
Stateful Firewall Rule

Step 2: Run Ryu application using ryu-manager on controller node.
Then, the stateful firewall script (secure_stateful_firewall.py) is run using ryu-manager.
Figure 7
Firewall Instance on Ryu
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Step 3: Test
To test the efficiency of the firewall and the rules, ping test is done. First H1 pings H2, which is
successful. However, H2 ping to H1 is unsuccessful. The firewall log can be seen on the
terminal. This rule can be customized to implement IP check functionality.
Figure 8
ICMP Test Results

Upon successful configuration of stateful firewall with relevant rules, following security
requirements were met:
-

IP Check

-

Close unnecessary ports/services

3. Snort Setup/Configuration
Step 1: Download, extract and install snort
Snort can be installed easily in ubuntu machine. To download and install snort, execute
$sudo apt-get install snort -y

49
Step 2: Create the required files and directory (as needed)
Upon installation, snort configuration and rules are created within /etc/snort. Rules are contained
within “rules” folder. Custom rules can be created as needed. For the purpose of this lab, a DDoS
detection rule that monitors ICMP packet overflow is created.
In the snort.conf file, include the new rules folder to implement it.
“include $RULE_PATH/custom.rules”
Step 3: Create the required rules (as needed)
To create custom rules, navigate to the rules folder and create a new file “custom.rules”. Set a
rule for detecting ICMP flood at any interface. This rule will create an alert if ICMP packet flow
triggers the threshold of 500 within 3 seconds.
Figure 9
Snort Rules

Step 4: Execute Snort
Upon successful rule creation, run snort in IDS mode. To display the alert in the console,
following command is executed:
#snort -A console -c /etc/snort/snort/conf
Step 5: Test
Next, we will test the IDS by simulating a ping flood attack in Mininet.
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Figure 10
ICMP Flood Attack Simulation

An alert is generated by Snort notifying of the ICMP flood in the terminal.
Figure 11
Snort Alert For ICMP Flood Attack

Upon successful configuration of snort with relevant rules, following security requirements were
met:
-

Log function

-

Anti-DoS mechanism

4. Syslog Server Configuration
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Step 1: Install the service
First, install using sudo apt-get install syslog-ng -y
Step 2: Configure syslog-ng server
Go to the configuration file “$ sudo nano /etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf“ and configure the
connection type to be used and define the specific IP or domain. We will also set the destination
for the file. All logs will be put in /var/log/syslog.
Figure 12
Syslog-ng/conf File Setup

Since the server is installed within same system, it is configured to log all system activities.
Step 3: Test
Log can be found in var/log/syslog.
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Figure 13
Syslog Log File

Upon successful configuration of syslog server, following security requirements were met:
-

Log function

Upon implementation of the framework, it is assessed to check for the security requirements
it helped satisfy and the threats mitigated using the framework. The table below shows the
summary of the results.
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Table 1
Security requirements and threat mitigation
Security Mechanisms

Security Requirements

Threats Mitigation
Successful

TLS w/ PKI

Authentication on controller

Unsuccessful



interface


TLS w/ PKI

User Authentication

TLS w/ PKI

Device Authentication



TLS v.1.2

Data-in-Transit encryption



Syslog

Log Function



Stateful Firewall

IP Check



Stateful Firewall

Application Privilege control

Snort IDS/IPS

Anti-DoS Mechanism




Comparative Analysis of Security existing security frameworks
Previously, we reviewed literature on the existing methodologies for securing the
Software-Defined Network. The literature included several studies that aimed in improving the
overall security or emphasizing security of specific SDN component.
In this section, we’ll analyze the finding from each research and evaluate their results for
successful satisfaction of the security requirements. This will provide an overview of security
frameworks for SDN and their security assurance.
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Table 2
Comparison of security requirement and proposed SDN security frameworks
Trust

Security

Zero Trust,

DC-SDN

Zero Trust

Framework

Tennison

Requirements

framework

Edge
ISA

Computing
Framework

Authentication on















controller interface

User Authentication
Device









Authentication
Data-in-Transit
encryption
Log Function









IP Check















Application Privilege



control

Anti-DOS Mechanism
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Upon mapping the security requirements each proposed framework satisfies, it is seen
each one has varying focus. Among the compared proposals, Cisco’s Zero Trust, Zero Trust
network satisfies all security requirements that are focused on this paper. However, because it
utilizes Cisco SaaS solution, it is not completely vendor independent (Dukinfield & Richardson,
2019). Regardless, all the compared frameworks along with the security framework proposed in
this paper provides value for security assurance of Software-Defined Networks.
Summary
Overall, this chapter presented identification of vulnerabilities present in SDN topology,
causes of those vulnerabilities and the mitigation techniques. This chapter also showed how the
implementation of security framework helped in remediation of security vulnerabilities though
various experiments. A comparative analysis helped in understanding how different frameworks
operate with different focal point for security.
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Chapter V: Discussion
Introduction
This section presents the analysis of the findings from the experiments so far. First, the
initial objective of the research is listed. It is followed by the analysis of the effectiveness of the
proposed security framework. This section also reviews each research question and presents the
answers to those questions based on the findings.
Data Analysis
Security of Software-defined networks is a much-speculated topic in networking. As
more and more networks worldwide adopt SDN topology, the security of SDN architecture and
an overall network has become crucial. Therefore, the objective of this research was to propose
and implement a security framework that integrates security mechanisms necessary to assure
security without compromising factors like performance, cost, and feasibility. This research was
able to deliver the initial objectives, which were:
1.

Propose a security framework for SDN

2.

Implement the security framework and test its effectiveness

3.

Ensure feasibility, flexibility, and performance
Firstly, we assessed the vulnerability of SDN topology through literature review and

study of the overall architecture. We were able to identify core security requirements like
confidentiality, integrity, and availability along with necessary security mechanisms to assure
these requirements were met. Based on the requirements, we proposed a security framework that
integrates all necessary security mechanisms. Then we tested the framework's effectiveness by
running a security assessment before and after implementing the framework on SDN topology.
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Throughout the research, we used qualitative and quantitative approaches to collect and validate
data and analyze the results of each experiment. It also helped us get answers to the research
questions that drove this thesis. We will discuss each research question in more detail below.
RQ1: How can security prerequisites be identified in Software-Defined Networks?
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability are the main prerequisite of security. During
the literature survey, a comprehensive study of SDN topology and its security specification was
done. This helped in understanding the security infrastructure of SDN. In chapter 3, the SDN
topology was assessed for its security standing. The comparative study of SDN topology and
security requirements can help identify the security prerequisite in SDN.
RQ2: What vulnerabilities and attack surfaces are associated with Software Defined
Networks (SDN) topology?
To identify the vulnerabilities, it is necessary to perform a security assessment of the
network. The tests can include vulnerability assessment tests, penetration tests, and general
reconnaissance to identify vulnerabilities with the risk level. Several tests were performed on the
SDN topology to assess the security of the architecture and the components. The vulnerabilities
and attack surfaces identified by the assessment are briefed in chapter 3.
RQ3: How can the security of SDN be improved? Can SDN architecture be leveraged to
enhance the security of the SDN?
As observed from the experiments, the security of SDN can undoubtedly be improved
through the implementation of the framework. The framework leveraged the SDN architecture to
improve the security of communication channels, detect and thwart DDoS attacks, and authoriz
hosts based on intrinsic policy definition. The security mechanisms were closely integrated with
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SDN components. Based on different environments, the framework can be altered to meet the
security requirements. The separation of data and control plane helped leverage the control
feature efficiently without the overload and delay in the overall network. Detailed insights on
how the framework aided the security of SDN topology is presented in Chapter 4.
However, there are limitations to the frameworks and some factors that needs to be
considered. They are briefed below:
a. While the TLS/PKI implementation is effective for authentication and authorization of
devices in SDN topology, it is necessary to consider that the certificate generation
process should be maintained for each individual device which might not be feasible
manually for constantly changing/expanding networks (Agborubere & SanchezVelazquez, 2018 ; Midha & Triptahi, 2019).
b. Since no specific standard is defined for northbound interface security, it is highly
dependent on the controller (Laan, 2015). The Ryu controller used in this research does
not support TLS for northbound interface and does not offer REST NBI Security (Oktian
et al., 2015). Therefore, Northbound API security need to be considered and investigated.
c. In addition to security requirements covered by this research, there are multiple attack
vectors like hypervisor security, host security, network security that need to be
considered (Open Networking Foundation, 2016). These attack surfaces can be secured
by following hardening standards. The proposed framework provides solutions specific to
SDN architecture.
Security is always specific to environment and necessity, and the proposed framework
satisfies the most basic security requirements. It offers enough flexibility to support additional
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security mechanisms and be deployed in a wide range of networks. The security mechanisms
included in this framework are open source and easily configurable.
Latency analysis
Network performance is a crucial factor in any environment. Different applications and
services running on the network equate to higher resource utilization and, in turn, can lead to
network latency (Alrouh & Ghinea, 2009). Since security mechanisms are invasive and consume
processing and storage resources, analyzing their impact on network latency and Quality of
Service (QoS) is necessary (Gurkas et al., 2006). Upon inspection of ICMP ping results from
different experiments done in this research, network latency from before and after implementing
security mechanisms is analyzed and plotted. The graph below represents the difference in
latency from H1 to H2 with a default payload of 64 bytes and no custom delay configured in the
link.
Figure 3
Network Latency Mapping
3.5

Response Time (ms)

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1

10
Latency(before)

20
Latency (after)

Number of Packets

30

60
Summary
This chapter successfully reviewed and analyzed the results and presented the answers to
each of the research questions. This section also presented insights on findings specific to the
research questions. Finally, it included a critical analysis of the research and its limitations.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
The exponential growth of technology and the interconnected network has created a huge
need for network virtualization and programmability. This has boosted the research and
implementation of technologies like SDN, whose flexibility and programmability support muchneeded scalability. While performance is a non-negotiable factor in many enterprise networks,
security is another component that cannot be compromised. With concerns of data security and
evolving threats, every technology requires to maintain a level of security. Similarly, a robust
security mechanism is necessary for Software-Defined Networks that come with their own set of
attack surfaces.
The evolution of technology has inherently led to the rise of different kinds of threats that
technology faces. As the systems are getting smarter, the threats are evolving to exploit these
systems. This is similar for Software-Defined Networks too. SDN differs from traditional
networks in how it supports network management and programmability. While these features can
be used to implement robust security systems, when left without specification can be susceptible
to numerous attacks. The high adaptation rate of SDN points towards a need for a security
framework that ensures security from traditional and evolving threats.
This research proposed and implemented a secure framework that focused primarily on
securing enterprise networks by implementing authentication, authorization, and auditing
mechanism. In order to do so, a detailed background study on the architecture, components, and
security specifications was done. The background study included review of the SDN topology,
its features and security vulnerabilities present in SDN components. This helped identify primary
security requirements. These requirements were verified by running assessments on a simulated
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SDN topology testbed. Finally, security mechanisms to mitigate the vulnerabilities were
proposed, implemented, and tested. The results validated the security of the proposed framework.
To conclude, this research attempted to narrow the gap between security requirements
and availability. The suggested mechanisms were chosen based on availability, functionality, and
ease. Since security is a constant process and has multiple vectors, the proposed framework
standalone is not sufficient. However, it is a step towards the implementation of safe practices.
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Chapter VII: Future Work
Security is a continuous process. As the technology progresses, so does the attack surface
and attack vectors. The goal of security is to keep up with growing technology and be a step
ahead of attackers. Security is not the same across different environments. This research helped
in concluding that security is highly dependent on the environment and necessity. Moreover, a
security framework should be accommodating to growing and differing requirements.
The framework proposed in this thesis centered around some vital security requirements
and therefore has limited mechanisms. This can be expanded to include additional security
controls. Next, the tests can be furthered to include “host,” “network,” and “application” centric
vulnerability assessments and mitigation techniques. This will expand the scope of the project
and set requirements for the additional security mechanisms.
Furthermore, the research can include penetration tests to test the strength of the security
controls implemented through the framework. Several rounds of tests and implementation can be
done to tune the framework to a specified security level. All in all, the research leaves plenty of
room for adjustment and upgrades.
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Appendix A: Stateful Firewall Script
from ryu.base import app_manager
from ryu.controller import ofp_event, dpset
from ryu.controller.handler import CONFIG_DISPATCHER,
MAIN_DISPATCHER,set_ev_cls
from ryu.ofproto import ofproto_v1_3, ofproto_v1_3_parser
from ryu.lib.packet import packet,ethernet,ipv4,udp,tcp,icmp
from ryu.ofproto.ether import ETH_TYPE_IP,
ETH_TYPE_ARP,ETH_TYPE_LLDP,ETH_TYPE_MPLS,ETH_TYPE_IPV6
from ryu.ofproto.inet import IPPROTO_ICMP, IPPROTO_TCP,
IPPROTO_UDP,IPPROTO_SCTP
from parse_firewall_rules import parse_firewall
from switch_information import SwitchInfo
from packet_out import SendPacket
from construct_flow import Construct
from connection_tracking import TrackConnection
ICMP_PING = 8
ICMP_PONG = 0
TCP_SYN = 0x02
TCP_SYN_ACK = 0x12
TCP_BOGUS_FLAGS = 0x15
class SecureFirewall(app_manager.RyuApp):
OFP_VERSIONS = [ofproto_v1_3.OFP_VERSION]
inner_policy = {}
icmp_conn_track = {}
tcp_conn_track = {}
udp_conn_track = {}
sendpkt = SendPacket()
flow = Construct()
track = TrackConnection()
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
super(SecureFirewall, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs)
self.mac_to_port = {}
parser = parse_firewall()
self.inner_policy = parser.parse()
self.logger.info("dict is ready")
@set_ev_cls(dpset.EventDP, dpset.DPSET_EV_DISPATCHER)
def handler_datapath(self, ev):
SwitchInfo(ev)
"""
Handles incoming packets. Decodes them
and checks for suitable Firewall rules.
"""
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@set_ev_cls(ofp_event.EventOFPPacketIn, MAIN_DISPATCHER)
def packet_in_handler(self, ev):
msg = ev.msg
datapath = msg.datapath
ofproto = datapath.ofproto
parser = datapath.ofproto_parser
in_port = msg.match['in_port']
try:
pkt = packet.Packet(msg.data)
eth = pkt.get_protocols(ethernet.ethernet)[0]
ethtype = eth.ethertype
out_port = self.port_learn(datapath, eth, in_port)
action_fwd_to_out_port = [parser.OFPActionOutput(out_port)]
action_drop = [parser.OFPActionOutput(ofproto.OFPPC_NO_FWD)]
actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
if(out_port != ofproto.OFPP_FLOOD) and (ethtype == ETH_TYPE_IP):
ipo = pkt.get_protocols(ipv4.ipv4)[0]
# Check for ICMP
if(ipo.proto == IPPROTO_ICMP):
icmpob = pkt.get_protocol(icmp.icmp)
flag1 = 0
# Check if this is PING
if ((icmpob.type==ICMP_PING) and
self.inner_policy.has_key(ipo.src)):
temp = self.inner_policy.get(ipo.src)
for i in range(0,len(temp)):
if temp[i][0] == ipo.dst:
xyz = temp[i]
if((xyz[1]=='ICMP') and (xyz[5] == 'ALLOW')):
flag1 = 1
actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
self.icmp_conn_track =
self.track.conn_track_dict(self.icmp_conn_track,ipo.src, ipo.dst, "PING",
"PONG", xyz[5],1)
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : ECHO
REQUEST ALLOWED" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst))
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port = in_port,
eth_type =
ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP, icmpv4_type= ICMP_PING,
ipv4_src = ipo.src,
ipv4_dst= ipo.dst)
break
# Otherwise, PONG...!
elif (icmpob.type==ICMP_PONG) and
self.icmp_conn_track.has_key(ipo.dst):
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tmp= self.icmp_conn_track.get(ipo.dst)
for i in range(0,len(tmp)):
if tmp[i][0] == ipo.src:
xyz = tmp[i]
if((xyz[1]=='PING') and
(xyz[2]=='PONG')):
flag1 = 1
actions_default =
action_fwd_to_out_port
self.logger.info("%s

->

%s : ECHO

REPLY ALLOWED" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst))
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port = in_port,
eth_type =
ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP, icmpv4_type= ICMP_PONG,
ipv4_src = ipo.src,
ipv4_dst= ipo.dst)
self.icmp_conn_track =
self.track.conn_track_dict(self.icmp_conn_track,ipo.src, ipo.dst, "PONG",
"PING", xyz[3],1)
self.logger.info("\n%s -> %s
action= PING state= ESTABLISHED \n" % (ipo.dst,ipo.src))
break
# What about no match ??
if (flag1 == 0):
actions_default = action_drop
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port = in_port,
eth_type = ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto =
IPPROTO_ICMP, icmpv4_type= icmpob.type,
ipv4_src = ipo.src, ipv4_dst=
ipo.dst)
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : BLOCKED" %
(ipo.src,ipo.dst))
#Check for TCP.
elif (ipo.proto == IPPROTO_TCP):
tcpo = pkt.get_protocol(tcp.tcp)
flag2 = 0
# TCP SYN packet
if (((tcpo.bits & TCP_SYN) == TCP_SYN) & ((tcpo.bits &
TCP_BOGUS_FLAGS) == 0x00)):
if self.inner_policy.has_key(ipo.src):
temp = self.inner_policy.get(ipo.src)
for i in range(0,len(temp)):
if ((temp[i][0] == ipo.dst) and
(temp[i][1]=='TCP') and (int(temp[i][2]) == tcpo.src_port) and
(int(temp[i][3]) == tcpo.dst_port) and (temp[i][5] == 'ALLOW')):
flag2= 1
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actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : SYN
ALLOWED" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst))
self.tcp_conn_track =
self.track.conn_track_dict(self.tcp_conn_track,ipo.src, ipo.dst,
tcpo.src_port, tcpo.dst_port, tcpo.seq, 1)
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port=in_port,
eth_type =
ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto = IPPROTO_TCP,
ipv4_src = ipo.src,
ipv4_dst = ipo.dst,
tcp_src =
tcpo.src_port, tcp_dst = tcpo.dst_port)
break
# TCP SYN ACK packet
elif((tcpo.bits & TCP_SYN_ACK) == TCP_SYN_ACK):
if self.tcp_conn_track.has_key(ipo.dst):
temp2 = self.tcp_conn_track.get(ipo.dst)
for i in range(0,len(temp2)):
if ((temp2[i][0] == ipo.src) and
(int(temp2[i][1]) == tcpo.dst_port) and (int(temp2[i][2]) == tcpo.src_port)):
flag2 = 1
actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : SYN ACK
ALLOWED" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst))
self.tcp_conn_track =
self.track.conn_track_dict(self.tcp_conn_track,ipo.src, ipo.dst,
tcpo.src_port, tcpo.dst_port, tcpo.seq, 1)
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port=in_port,
eth_type =
ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto = IPPROTO_TCP,
ipv4_src = ipo.src,
ipv4_dst = ipo.dst,
tcp_src =
tcpo.src_port, tcp_dst = tcpo.dst_port)
self.logger.info("\n%s -> %s src_port=
%s dst_port= %s state= ESTABLISHED \n" %
(ipo.dst,ipo.src,temp2[i][1],temp2[i][2]))
break
# All remaining TCP packets, like, ACK, PUSH, FIN etc.
else:
if self.tcp_conn_track.has_key(ipo.src):
temp3 = self.tcp_conn_track.get(ipo.src)
for i in range(0,len(temp3)):
if ((temp3[i][0] == ipo.dst) and
(int(temp3[i][1]) == tcpo.src_port) and (int(temp3[i][2]) == tcpo.dst_port)):
flag2 = 1
actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
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self.logger.info("%s
TRANSMISSION ALLOWED" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst))
break

->

%s :

# What if no match found ?
if (flag2 == 0):
actions_default = action_drop
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : BLOCKED" %
(ipo.src,ipo.dst))
#Check for UDP
elif (ipo.proto == IPPROTO_UDP):
flag3 = 0
udpo = pkt.get_protocol(udp.udp)
# Check for tracked UDP
if self.udp_conn_track.has_key(ipo.dst):
tmp_tpl = self.udp_conn_track.get(ipo.dst)
tmp = list(tmp_tpl)
for i in range(0,len(tmp)):
if (tmp[i][0] == ipo.src):
xyz = tmp[i]
if ((int(xyz[1]) == udpo.dst_port) and
(int(xyz[2]) == udpo.src_port) and (xyz[3] == 'UNREPLIED')):
flag3 = 1
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : UDP PACKET
ALLOWED" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst))
actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
del tmp[i]
### We need to remove
this state entry to keep this packet 'REPLIED'
self.logger.info("\n%s -> %s src_port=
%s dst_port= %s state= ASSURED\n" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst, udpo.src_port,
udpo.dst_port))
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port=in_port,
eth_type =
ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto = IPPROTO_UDP,
ipv4_src = ipo.src,
ipv4_dst = ipo.dst,
udp_src =
udpo.src_port, udp_dst = udpo.dst_port)
break
tmp_tpl = tuple(tmp)
if len(tmp_tpl) != 0:
self.udp_conn_track[ipo.dst] = tmp_tpl
else:
self.udp_conn_track.pop(ipo.dst,None)
# Check for first UDP packet
elif self.inner_policy.has_key(ipo.src):
temp = self.inner_policy.get(ipo.src)
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for i in range(0,len(temp)):
if temp[i][0] == ipo.dst:
xyz = temp[i]
if((xyz[1]=='UDP') and (int(xyz[2]) ==
udpo.src_port) and (int(xyz[3]) == udpo.dst_port) and (xyz[5] == 'ALLOW')):
flag3 = 1
actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
self.udp_conn_track =
self.track.conn_track_dict(self.udp_conn_track,ipo.src, ipo.dst,
udpo.src_port,udpo.dst_port , "UNREPLIED",1)
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : UDP
PACKET ALLOWED" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst))
self.logger.info("\n%s -> %s src_port=
%s dst_port= %s state= UNREPLIED\n" % (ipo.src,ipo.dst, udpo.src_port,
udpo.dst_port))
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port=in_port,
eth_type =
ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto = IPPROTO_UDP,
ipv4_src = ipo.src,
ipv4_dst = ipo.dst,
udp_src =
udpo.src_port, udp_dst = udpo.dst_port)
break
# what if no match found ?
if (flag3 == 0):
actions_default = action_drop
self.logger.info("%s -> %s : UDP BLOCKED" %
(ipo.src,ipo.dst))
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath,
actions=actions_default, priority=1001, in_port=in_port,
eth_type =
ETH_TYPE_IP, ip_proto = IPPROTO_UDP,
ipv4_src = ipo.src,
ipv4_dst = ipo.dst,
udp_src =
udpo.src_port, udp_dst = udpo.dst_port)
# If not ICMP, TCP or UDP then drop..!
else:
self.logger.info("Wrong IP protocol found")
actions_default = action_drop
# Handling ARP Rules.
elif(ethtype == ETH_TYPE_ARP):
self.arp_handling(datapath, out_port, eth, in_port)
actions_default = action_fwd_to_out_port
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# If packet is not IP or ARP then drop..!
else:
actions_default = action_drop
except Exception as err:
self.logger.info("MYERROR: %s" , err.message)
action_drop = [parser.OFPActionOutput(ofproto.OFPPC_NO_FWD)]
actions_default = action_drop
finally:
self.sendpkt.send(datapath, msg, in_port, actions_default)
"""
Add ARP rules on Flow Tables
"""
def arp_handling(self,datapath, out_port, eth_obj, in_port):
if(out_port != datapath.ofproto.OFPP_FLOOD):
actions = [datapath.ofproto_parser.OFPActionOutput(out_port)]
self.flow.add_flow(datapath=datapath, actions=actions,
priority=1000, in_port=in_port,
eth_type= ETH_TYPE_ARP, eth_src= eth_obj.src,
eth_dst = eth_obj.dst)
"""
Learn Switch port associated with a MAC address here
"""
def port_learn(self, datapath, eth_obj, in_port):
try:
self.mac_to_port.setdefault(datapath.id, {'90:e2:ba:1c:55:54':1 ,
'90:e2:ba:1c:55:55':2})
self.mac_to_port[datapath.id][eth_obj.src] = in_port
if (eth_obj.ethertype == ETH_TYPE_IP) or (eth_obj.ethertype ==
ETH_TYPE_ARP):
if eth_obj.dst in self.mac_to_port[datapath.id]:
out_port = self.mac_to_port[datapath.id][eth_obj.dst]
else:
out_port = datapath.ofproto.OFPP_FLOOD
except Exception as err:
self.info(err.message)
out_port = datapath.ofproto.OFPP_FLOOD
finally:
return out_port

